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10 BAINE v. CONTIN:ENTAL ASSUR. CO. [21 C.2d 
The majority opinion further states: "The interpretation 
of the clause urged by appellant \vould lead to absurd and 
obviously unintended results. It would mean that an insured, 
'knowing that the physical ('xamination required for a life 
policy was different and less strict than that required for a 
policy with disability benefits, could secure the issuance of 
a strip life policy, and then, immediately, without further 
medical examination, demand and secure the issuance of a 
life policy with disability benefits. It would als{) mean that 
all persons who have life policies containing such a clause, 
if they became disabled before attaidng the age of sixty, 
could, upon the cOllditions set forth in the clause, secure dis-
ability insurance, and thus secure a life income after the 
disability had been incurred." 
A complete answer to the foregoing discussion contained in 
the majority opinion is that thc insurance company could 
by clear and unambiguous language have provided against 
the eventualities contemplated in such discussion; that it did 
not do so should not militate against the insured in the casp 
at bar who is entitled to have the policy construed in a mall-
ner which affords the greatest measure of protection to him 
if such construction is equally fair with a contrary interpreta-
tion. That a similar provision has been interpreted in favol' 
of the insured by the Supreme Court of.North Carolina should 
be conclusive on the proposition that the provision in ques-
tion is susceptible to two interpretations. The fact that an 
insu:rance company first refused to issue a policy of insur-
ance to an individual, but did so later, would afford it no 
ground for denying liability which arosc under a policy so 
issued. 
The majority opinion, however, brushes aside the Rosenberg 
case with the mere assertion that "that opinion fails to dis-
cuss the various arguments set forth in this opiuion which 
we think are conclusive," and that "the reasoning of the 
cited case, in our opinion, is unsound." However, I think 
it can be said to the credit of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina thatfn decidill~ the Rosenberg case it did not ig-nore 
settled rules of construction applicablc to insurance policies 
or attempt to write a new contract for the parties. In my 
humble opinion, the decision in that case excels in sound 
reasoning and judicial erudition the opinion of the majority 
of this court in the case at bar. 
In my opinion the judgment should be reversed. 
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MRS. R. W. JUDSON, SR., et al., Petitioners, v. THE 
SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 
Respondent. 
[lJ 
[2J 
[3] 
[4J 
[5J 
Appearance-General Appearance-Characterization as Spe-
cial Appearance.-Whether an appearance is general or spe-
cial is determined by the character of the relief sought,not 
by the intention of the party that it shall or shall not operate 
as one or the other. His statement that he is making aspe-
cial appcarance is not conclusive. .. 
ld.-Special Appearance.-If a party appears and objects only 
to the consideration of the case or any procedure in it because 
the court has not acquired jurisdiction of his person, the ap-
pearance is special. 
ld.-General Appearance-Test.-If a party appears and asks 
for any relief which ean be given only to a party in a pending 
case, or which itself would be a regular proceeding in the case, 
that is to say, if he raises any other question than that of 
want of jurisdiction over his person, or asks relief that can 
be granted only upon the hypothesis that the court has such 
jm-isdiction, the appearance is general, regardless of the char-
acterization thereof. 
ld.-General Appearance -' Motions-To Dismiss;-Where a 
party makes a motion pursuant to Code Civ. Proc.,§ 583, to 
dismiss an action, and such motion is based on the hypothesis 
that the court had jurisdiction over the person of the movant, 
he thereby makes a general appearance. The fact that the 
motion was denied is of no consequence in determining the 
nature of the appearance. 
Dismissal-Delay in Trial-Exception to Rule.-The general 
rule requiring dismissal of an action not brought to trial 
within five years after the filing thereof (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 583) is subject to an exception where· the case cannot be 
brought to trial as a result of defendant's conduct, such as hi!' 
evasive and surreptitiomi' llonduct in avoiding service of sum-
mons. 
[3] See 3 Cal. JUl'. fl, 12; 3 Am. Jur. 788, 790. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appearance, §§ 8, 19; [2] Appear-
ance, § 28; [3] Appearance, § 8; [4J Appearance, §11; [5J Dis-
missal, § 66. 
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12 JUDSON tt. SUPERIOR COURT [21C.2d 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County from rendering judgment 
against petiti6ners .. · Writ denied. 
Macfarlane, Schaefer, Hann & Mulford, Macfarlane, Scliae.. 
fer'& Haun and William Gamble for Petitioners. 
J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel, Douglas De Coster, Dep-
uty County Counsel, and Victor L. Mindlin for Respondent. 
'. 'THE COUR'l'.-Upon a further consideration of theques-
tions presented by the petitioners in this proceeding, t4e. 
opinion upon which th~ case was decided when the m.atter 
was before the District Court of Appeal, and now modified 
in part, is adopted as the opinion of this court. In stating 
the reasons for the decision, Mr. Justice' White . said : 
"In this proceeding, th~ petitioners claim that they are 
entitled to a writ of prohibition restraining respondent court 
from rendering jndgnlent against petitiollers, following· (he 
entry of their default in an action brought against them in 
said court. On April l8, 1935, an action was commenced in 
respondent superior court against petition~rs by one Oharles 
R.. Bertrand, and upon t4e same date summons was issued. 
On April 21, 1941, petitioners herein as .defendants in the 
action served and filed a notice of motion to dismiss the action 
for want of prosecution, by reason of the fact. that five years 
had elapsed since the filing thereof. (§ 583, Code Civ. Proc;) 
In the aforesaid notice or motion it was stated specifically 
that the. moving parties 'will make a special appearance for 
the purpose of, moving this Court for an order dismissing 
the above. entitled a~tion.' Without narrating in detail ,each 
and all of the acts done by plaintiff in the action to effect 
service of complaint· and summons upon petitioners, as de'-
fendants th('rein, suffice it to 'Say that at the hearing of the 
aforesaid motioti in respondent court, there were introduced 
various affidavits £romwh~chit appeared that plaintiff had 
made constant,diligent an'd ttnceasing, but unavgiling, efforts 
to serve petitioners with process thr6ughoutthe years inter-
veningbetween the filing o:fthe action and the hearing on 
the motion to dismiss same. Based upon such affidavits; the 
filing of which is alleged in respondent court's answer t10the 
petitiQ~ herein, and which filing is undenied, the court denieq 
the motion of petitioners ontlie 'ground that 'they had .either 
secreted themselves within the State of California to p'revent 
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scrvice of summons, or had resided outside'the"St~t~oiC~i~ 
fornia,' by reason of which respondent cour~ cletertt4tied 
that at no time did it have the power to proceed to trial in 
said action. . '." 
.' 'Petitioners' contentions herein are twofold: .A, •. That We 
motion to dismiss under section 583 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure is not. a gener~l appearance, and, pl,~t,. ~her~fore, 
the court had no right to ordcr the default 'of tp,e;,defen<iants 
entered. B. That after five year$}lad elapsed: from th,e tim¢ 
an action is filed, and said cause haS not b~en, b~ough'/; to 
trial, the trial court lc;>ses j:urisdiction oversai~' Mtion for 
all purposes, except to dismiss the. sam~. _,.... 
[1] "Whether an appearance is ge;neralc;>r,specialis de-
termined by the character of the reliefsoughtand,not byt4~ 
intention of the party that it shall, or jilialLn.ot,,()perate .. a.sjl 
general or speeial appearance, The statement Olea defendant 
or party .. th. a ..t ~eis ma. king. a.' speci~l afP.' .earance is.,not. neces.~ sarily conclUSIve. [2] The testlS- . ld the.partt. appe&r 
and object only to the consideration 0 . the' case Or Q,ily prO-
cedure in it because the court had no~ acquire(i, jurisdictipn 
oftha perso?, of t~e defendant or PtrtyY ;rf so,then .the 
appearance 18 speCIal. [S] It, howe,ver, he appe,arsan4 
asks for any relief which could be given onlt toa p'ar:tyin 
a pending case, or which itself would b~aregular procee,ding . 
in the case; it is a general appearance regardless . of ~ho:W' 
adroitly, carefully or directly the .appearance may be de;rloJrii-
nated or charac~-ized as speciaL (l~ re Clarke, 125 CaL 
388 [58 P .. 22].) The rule in this regard may be epitomiZed 
by saying tll,at if a defe,ndant by his appea.rance. insists onl1 
upon the objection that· h~ is liot. in 'cQurt forwant6f juris-
diction over his personaild confines his .appearance for ,that 
purpose only, then he has made a spec.W ,appel1:r:iiilce, but 
if he raisesnny other questilin, or asks any reliet whichcari 
only be granted upon the hypothesis that theco1irth~ 
jurisdiction of his person, the:n he had made.:a, ,gcIl,er_nlS;p:. 
pelj.rance~(Oloese v~ Justioe's Oourt,lM Cat 82 [lOS,P .. 
317] ; Zobel v. Zobel, 151 Cal. 98 [gO ],>:., i91],), ;:'( 
. [4] "In the instant case we ai'~ 'impr~sed that p~ti .. 
tioners in. seeking a. dismjssal of the case, ,pur~mm.to:,th~ 
provisi~ns of sectIon 583 of the Code'OfOivil:~rbeedUr.et;~e 
,invokhig the affirmative action 'Of. thecottr1;; in: tlieir':,beliitlf<to 
term:inate the litigation,. How they corildlipply;fo~:th~,t.~liaf:· 
l!-s.ked oil any other theory than tMt ,they.;iwere .sublllittfrig; !, 
themselves to the general jurisdiction of the court iii the' 
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action is not apparent to us, because the relief they sought 
was such as could be given only to a party in a pending 
case. (Zobel v. Zobel, supra.)" 
[5] The petitioners' claim that when an action is not 
brought to trial within five years after the filing thereof, the 
court loses jurisdiction thereof for all purposes, save only to 
dismiss it, and that the court must exercise its obligatory 
duty. Answering that contention, said Mr. Justice White, 
the provisions of section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
rE:quire the court to dismiss an action when the statutory 
requirements are met. But, he correct~y observed, the rule 
is not so rigid as· to be without exception, and an action 
should not be dismissed when, as a result of the conduct or 
action of a defendant, the plaintiff may not proceed to trial 
with reasonable certainty that a judgment would conclu-
sively determine the rights of the parties. 
In the present case, . according to affidavits filed in 1940 
in response to a motion to dismiss the action, the plaintiffs 
were advised by persons living where the petitioners had 
formerly made their home, that they were then residing with-
out the State of California. Later, the petitioner Ross W. 
Judson successfully moved the court to quash service of sum-
mons upon him. In connection with the petitioners' last mo-
tion, the rUling upon which is now. presented for determina-
tion, facts were shown which justified a finding that service 
of summons had not been made upon them because of their 
evasion ahd concealment. 
Under these circumstances, to require the plaintiffs to take 
the uncertain path of publication of summons against defen-
dants who, they had been informed, were non-residents, 
would reward subterfuge and make dishonesty profitable. 
The courts have recognized that the statute relating to dis~ 
missals although ~andatory in form, should not be applied 
where, although the defendant was not guilty of acts tend-
ing to obstruct the administration of justice, it would have 
been impracticable for the plaintiff to have brought the 
action t6 trial. (Ohristi'li v. Superior Oourt, 9 Ca1.2d· 526 
[71 P.2d 205, 112 A.L.R. 1153J; Estate of Morrison, 125 
Cal.App. 504 [14 P.2d 102J; and Kinard v. Jordan, 175 
Cal. 13 [164 P. 894J.) The facts of the present case show 
much greater justification for an exception to the statutory 
requirement than those heretofore presented as the baSis for 
an order denying a motion to dismiss. 
Because of the former decisions, Mr. Justice White con-
Oct; 1942] JUDSON v. SUPERIOR COURT 
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cluded, "the only hypothesis upon which the petitioners could 
base their motion to dismiss under section 583 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure was that respondent court had the power 
to proceed to trial of said cause, and this hypothesis neces-
sarily . prE;'supP9ses and includes that respondEmt court was 
clothed with jurisdiction of the persons of petitioners. Such 
appearance on the part of petitioners was therefore a general 
appearance by them, and the ·fact that tliecourt denied I)eti- . 
tioners' motion is of no consequenG€ in determining thena~ 
tureOftheirappea,rancc, any more than was t.hedesignation 
of the same· by petitioners as a special app~arance. Having 
made a general appearance and thereafter failing to plead iIi. 
the action, and the eourt having correctly r,uled upon such 
motion under the facts here· presented, no. error was com-
mitted by respondent court in directing' th~,entryof the, 
default of said petitioners, and respondentcirart should hot 
be restrained from entering a judgment agalIisfthem.'" '. 
Linden Gravel Mining 00. v. Sheplar,530at2~5;'isover: 
mlea and·Anderson v. Nawa, 25 Cal.App. 151 fi43 p.5551; 
is disapproved. 
It . is ordered that the alternative writ i~ued herei~ 
discharged; the peremptory writ prayed for is denied. 
TRAYNOR, J.~I dissent. It is my opinion that there,~ 
spondentcourt haS not acquired jurisdiction over the petio' 
tioners and should therefore be restrained from entering,s: 
default judgment against them. While I agree .that .the COUtt· . 
properly denied petitioners' motion, r do not believe that· 
petitioners made a general appearance in seeking· adismissai 
of . the action. Had they requested a ruling' that could "be 
made only upon the hypothesis that the court.had jurJsdiction 
over them, the appearance would be generalj,for'by.making 
the request .they would admit that ~he court had jurisdiction, 
thereby waiving its lack of jurisdiction. Thus; in the case 
of l'lire Clarke, 125 Cal. 388 [58 P.22], relied upon in the 
majority opinion, the defendant admitted the jUrisdiction of 
the court by demurring to the complaint. .A court does. not' 
sustain demurrers and decide moot questions of persons over . 
whom it has no jurisdiction. Likewise, in Zobel v. Zobel, 151 
Cal. 98 [90 P. 191J, cited in the majority opinion, the defen~ 
dant filed an answer, a pleading preparatory to a hearing 
on the merits, which eould not be considered by the court if 
it did not have jurisdiction over the defendant. I do not 
t' 
t: 
16 
'JUDSON ·v. SUPERIOR COURT 
. [21 C;2d 
believe, however, that a defendant invadably makes a general 
appearance by raising a question other than Iacl( of juris-
!liction, and I therefore disagree with the statements to the . 
contrary in Olcese v. Justice's Ouurt, 156 Cal. 82 [103 P. 
317], and Raps v. Raps, 20 Cal.2d 382 [125 P.2d.826]. It 
has been held by this. court that by requesting and securing 
an order e~tonQing time to plead, a defenda.nt does not make 
a general appearjtnce or admit that the courtha~ acquired jurisdict~on over his P!!rso:n. (l)enson v. l)enson, 176 Cal. 649 [170~. 1182.] ; DauenpQrt v. Superior Oourt, 183 Cal. 506 
511 n~l,p;. 911J.) )\, ~ourt does not need jurisdiction over 
the person to grapt such. au order, and there iR. no incon-
SistcUClY illrpqull$~illgSu~han order while mllintaining that 
the c.ourt la('k~ jurjsd:ic.tioll. Similarly, aCOllrt without jhris-
diction over the person can dismiss an action under, section 
58:l Of the Code of Civil ProcedUre, and tt defendant, }\rith-
out being inconsistent Or impliedly recol~nizirig the jurisdic-
tion of the,colirt, can reql1est suchllllorder while maintaining 
that the court lacks jurisdiction. There is nothing in section 
583 to limit the cl:lss of persons Who can have actions dis-
missed. Neither e'll:pressly nOr by implication does'the statute 
make a gf~nera1 appearance a condition of securing the. dis-
missal 6f an action t~rClihder.. Thus, in Sharpstein v. Eells, 
132' Cal. 507 [G4 P. i080], in holding that an appearance to 
dismiss an action for failure to S(.lrve a summons within the 
three.·. years prescribed by Code ofCiviI Procedure section 
581 (7), as amended in 1889, was a special appearance only, 
the eourt declared: ", ... if defendant 'Vohlntl!tdly appears, 
and answers,and demands Ii trial, after the three year/!!, the 
court· bas .. jurisdictioh toproeeed. In this case thQrespon-
dl1nt did hot. S(} appear. The:, fact that plaintiff, after t}jre.e 
years, had the SUD.1InOns s{!rVedl1pon her, and that default 
Was ept<>red, did not sho:w any consent or ,"oluntary' appear~ 
ance,:Whcn she appeared it was for the purpose of asking 
that the· action be dismissed as to her. She had the right to 
have it dismis:"ed." (See, also, Linden Gra'l)el!l!ining Co. v. 
Sheplar, 530al. 245; Andersonv. Nawa, 25 Cal.App. 151' [143 
P. 555J; Altpeter v. Postal Telegraph-Cable 00., 26 Cal.App. 
705 [148 p~ 241] ; Me Baine, Practice: Objections to Jurisdic-
tion Over the Person'and the Subject Matter, 30 CaI.L. Rev. 690.) 
Petitioners' application fora rehearing was denied October 
29, 1942. TraYnor, J.,voted for a rehearing .. 
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LUCY ·FAY BALES, Petitioner, v. THE; SU'rE.RIOB: 
COURT OF 110S ANGELES COUNTY,Respondent.;i;lh. 
[1]. Decedents' Estates ___ HeirshipProceedingS:-O-Dfifaults.-....:-The:.' 
.. omission £rom Prob. Code, §§1086~l,o$~,. r~lati.n~ tol1e~!!hip.­
i>roceedin~s, of the provisiol). £oradjl.'ldgin.1t dcfaul~scont~~n~d, ... 
in former Gode Civ. Proc.~ § 1664,impliel!l1habroga,tt()no~ ~h~ .. 
i~r:~fo!~o::~~t~e n:!;~eina~;~~~:r~io~!la~tl:i~ltf:~:~t~e:~ , 
thority to order n default' against any' p~rsonwho had Jl,ot 
. theretofore appMred therein. 
[2]· Id.-Heirship Procecdings.--Trial-JU17.-Prob. Code, §l081. 
providing for a jUry trial ili heirship proceedings, givese:r~ry­
one ~laiming relrttioI\ship to ,the deceased, whether upon ini-
tiating petition or statement of heirship pr~sented after the 
commencement of the procccd~ng, the right to hav:e all evi-
cdeilC~ affecting the disposition o£.the issue submitted, to a jury. 
The Frialcourt usurps the£unctions of ,a jury 'whet;l, on 'pre-
limirla,ry motion, it refuses to permit a claimant to participate 
in the determination of such a procecding. 
[3] Id~ ...... Heh·shipProceedings-'-ClaimantsEnteri.l1gProceeding8;-' 
In view of Prob, Code,§10!51,rc(ltigniZingthc,.rlght ,o~ .one 
claiJli.in~ ,to be an heir of it deccdept' to enter or 'l'e~eJlter an 
hej.rship proceeding prior to the' subniission,ofthe issueso! 
factfor,decis~on, .U trial court hus~nodis.c:re~io~ai7~()wer' ,to' 
exclude a.· clmmant mllrely because he secksc,titry Jnt~t {pe 
proc(l('ding during the tri:tlofcertain questions of law, pre-
liminary to thc impanelment of the jUry. . 
[4] Mandamus..,..,., To Courts-Hei~ship l'roceedingsi~A wrlt6:e 
mandate will issue where a. ~uperior ()olirt byvoidordera· 
IItrikes.'froman hoirship proceeding the appearuJlce Qfa. cJaiD:i-
ant, and dismisses him from the proceeding, wher~ suc~ ord~rS 
are not appealable :tnt! their review on appeaffrom the jl1dg~ 
mEmt determining heirship would not furnish an adequate 
remedy. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus tp 'conipel the Superior Court. 
of Los. Angeles County to permit pariicipatipn in. a pending 
proceeding to determine heirship. Writ issued. 
[1] Sec 23 Cal. Jur. 778. 
(41 Sec 16 Cal. Jur. H20; 35 Am. Jur., 29. .' 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1, .3J Ilecedents' ;Estates, §987; [2] D.&. 
cedents' Estates, § !lSS; [4J Mandamus, § 44. . 
